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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
General Motors Corporation (GM) filed this interlocutory 
appeal, contending that the action brought against it is 
preempted under the federal labor laws. The action was 
filed by former GM employees who allege that GM 
fraudulently induced them to accept early retirement. After 
the District Court denied GM's motion for summary 
judgment, GM sought, and received, certification of two 
issues for interlocutory appeal: (1) whether the plaintiffs' 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
*The Honorable Frank J. Magill, of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation. 
 
                                4 
  
fraud claims are preempted by section 301 of the Labor 
Management Relations Act (LMRA), and (2) whether the 
claims are preempted under sections 7 and 8 of the 
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). 
 
I. 
 
BACKGROUND 
 
The operative facts are, for the most part, undisputed. On 
December 3, 1992, GM issued a press release announcing 
that several of its plants were slated for closure by the end 
of the fourth quarter of 1993. Among those plants was the 
Inland Fisher Guide Division factory in Trenton, New 
Jersey. The employees at the Trenton plant were 
represented by Local # 731 of the United Automobile 
Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America 
Union (UAW), and, at all relevant times, were covered by a 
collective bargaining agreement between GM and the UAW. 
On December 14, 1992, shortly after GM's announcement 
of the anticipated plant closures, GM and the UAW reached 
an agreement, denominated as the Special Acceleration 
Attrition Agreement (SAAA), under which employees over 
the age of 50 who had more than 10 years of service with 
the company could take an early retirement package. The 
SAAA program was available only until March 1, 1993, a 
period of slightly more than two months. GM insists that, 
despite the temporal proximity of the announced plant 
closings and the agreement establishing the SAAA, the 
negotiation of the SAAA was unrelated to the announced 
plant closures, a proposition that plaintiffs do not appear to 
dispute. 
 
On December 23, 1992, Terry Marquis, the manager of 
the Trenton plant, issued a newsletter to the plant's 
employees confirming that the plant would be closed and 
advising the employees to disregard any rumors to the 
contrary. The newsletter stated, in relevant part: 
 
       Believe me when I say that all talk about potentially 
       keeping Trenton open is false optimism originating 
       right from this plant. No one at our divisional executive 
       level is actively working on a scenario that could 
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       possibly keep Trenton open. . . . I know I'm being 
       blunt, but I know there are many people making 
       difficult decisions regarding retirement. I would not 
       want any rumors influencing those decisions. The 
       worst thing anyone could do would be to turn down 
       one of the best mutual retirement programs available 
       because of a rumor and then later lose what is 
       available when the plant closes. 
 
App. at 1109. A February 9, 1993 newsletter, also authored 
by Marquis, emphatically reiterated that the plant was 
going to be closed. In the newsletter, Marquis stated, "Let 
me leave no doubt -- the plant is closing. Many people take 
the absence of visible movement of jobs, tools, and 
equipment as a sign that something is up. Not so!" App. at 
1203. 
 
Nearly 200 of the employees at the Trenton plant 
accepted the SAAA early retirement package before the 
March 1, 1993 deadline. On March 3, 1993, GM announced 
plans to pursue the sale of the plant as a going concern as 
a possible alternative to closure. In the course of the 
following year, GM negotiated with several companies, but 
no agreement was reached. In May 1994, GM approved a 
plan--drafted by a joint labor-management committee--to 
keep the Trenton plant open. 
 
Six of the GM Trenton employees who accepted the SAAA 
package filed this suit against GM on January 31, 1995 in 
federal district court. Plaintiffs asserted three state-law 
claims: fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and age 
discrimination. Plaintiffs also filed an action in the same 
court on June 21, 1995 against Local # 731 and against the 
UAW (collectively "the Union"), alleging breach of the duty 
of fair representation. Both suits were filed by plaintiffs on 
behalf of themselves and a putative class of former Trenton 
workers. The District Court consolidated the two actions, 
later dismissed the age discrimination claim against GM, 
and thereafter denied plaintiffs' motion for class 
certification in the GM action. However, the court permitted 
amendments adding 185 individual plaintiffs. 
 
Plaintiffs then filed an amended two-count complaint. 
Count one is directed at GM and alleges fraud; count two 
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is against the Union and alleges a breach of the duty of fair 
representation. The complaint alleges that from December 
3, 1992 to March 2, 1993--the period during which the 
early retirement option was available--GM falsely 
represented to the Trenton employees that the plant would 
close and that no efforts were being made to keep the plant 
open, when in fact the company was actively seeking to sell 
the factory as a going concern. GM knowingly made these 
false representations, the complaint alleges, to induce the 
employees to take the early retirement package (thereby 
presumably making the plant more attractive to potential 
buyers). The complaint alleges that the 191 plaintiffs relied 
on GM's representations to their detriment by giving up 
their jobs for a retirement package that they would not 
have accepted if they had known that there was a 
possibility of the plant's staying open. GM and the Union 
defendants moved for summary judgment. 
 
The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of 
the Union, and that issue is not before us. At the same 
time, it denied GM's motion for summary judgment, ruling 
that the fraud claim was not preempted by either the LMRA 
or the NLRA and that, on the basis of the record evidence, 
a reasonable jury could conclude that the plaintiffs satisfied 
the elements of common-law fraud under New Jersey law. 
 
At GM's request, the court certified and we accepted two 
issues for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. S 1292(b): 
whether plaintiffs' fraud claim against GM is preempted by 
(1) section 301 of the LMRA, or (2) sections 7 and 8 of the 
NLRA under the principles of so-called "Garmon 
preemption." Our standard of review is plenary. See Travitz 
v. Northeast Dep't. ILGWU Health and Welfare Fund, 13 
F.3d 704, 708 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 
II. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
The District Court's certification order accurately frames 
the issues: 
 
       (1) whether plaintiffs' fraud claim is preempted by 
       S 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act ("LMRA"), 
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       29 U.S.C. S 185, because resolution of this claim is 
       substantially dependent upon analysis of the terms of 
       the GM-UAW collective bargaining agreements; [and] 
 
       (2) whether plaintiffs' fraud claim is preempted by SS 7 
       and 8 of the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"), 
       particularly the Garmon preemption doctrine[.] 
 
Voilas v. General Motors Corp., Nos. 95-487, 95-2960, slip 
op. at 2 (D.N.J. Sept. 2, 1997). We address these issues in 
turn. 
 
A. 
 
Section 301 Preemption 
 
GM argues that plaintiffs' fraud claim runs afoul of the 
preemption doctrine that has developed around section 301 
of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. S 185. This is so, argues GM, 
because resolution of plaintiffs' fraud claims would require 
analysis and interpretation of collective bargaining 
agreements between the UAW and GM, an undertaking not 
permitted by the LMRA preemption doctrine. 
 
Section 301(a) of the LMRA states, in relevant part: 
 
       Suits for violation of contracts between an employer 
       and a labor organization representing employees in an 
       industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, 
       or between any such labor organizations, may be 
       brought in any district court of the United States 
       having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to 
       the amount in controversy or without regard to the 
       citizenship of the parties. 
 
29 U.S.C. S 185(a). 
 
The Supreme Court, in Textile Workers Union of America 
v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 455-56 (1957), made clear 
that this provision is not merely jurisdictional, but is also 
one that calls on the federal courts to create a uniform 
federal common law of collective bargaining, with the 
primacy of arbitral resolution of industrial disputes as its 
centerpiece. Accordingly, the Court has held that state laws 
that might produce differing interpretations of the parties' 
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obligations under a collective bargaining agreement are 
preempted. See Local 174, Teamsters of Am. v. Lucas Flour 
Co., 369 U.S. 95, 103-04 (1962). The Lucas Flour Court 
explained the particular need for uniformity under section 
301 thus: 
 
       The possibility that individual contract terms might 
       have different meanings under state and federal law 
       would inevitably exert a disruptive influence upon both 
       the negotiation and administration of collective 
       agreements. Because neither party could be certain of 
       the rights which it had obtained or conceded, the 
       process of negotiating an agreement would be made 
       immeasurably more difficult by the necessity of trying 
       to formulate contract provisions in such a way as to 
       contain the same meaning under two or more systems 
       of law which might someday be invoked in enforcing 
       the contract. 
 
Id. at 103. 
 
The jurisprudence of preemption of state-law claims 
under section 301 thereafter evolved in a series of Supreme 
Court cases decided from 1985 to 1994. The standard for 
determining when a state claim is preempted was first 
articulated in Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 
(1985). In that case, an employee, who had suffered an 
injury that qualified him for disability benefits under his 
collective bargaining agreement, filed a tort claim against 
his employer for bad-faith processing of an insurance claim 
under a Wisconsin bad-faith tort statute. He alleged that 
the employer had harassed him for filing the claim and had 
directed the insurer to cease making payments to him. The 
Supreme Court found the claim preempted. In so doing, it 
stressed that the mere characterization of the claim as 
sounding in tort rather than contract did not bar the 
operation of section 301 preemption and reasoned that 
preemption of the employee's claim was necessary in order 
to avoid "allow[ing] parties to evade the requirements of 
S 301 by relabeling their contract claims as claims for 
tortious breach of contract." Id. at 211. 
 
The Allis-Chalmers Court articulated the standard for 
preemption as follows: "[W]hen resolution of a state-law 
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claim is substantially dependent upon analysis of the terms 
of an agreement made between the parties in a labor 
contract, that claim must either be treated as a S 301 claim 
or dismissed as pre-empted . . . ." Id. at 220 (citation 
omitted). Applying this standard, the Court concluded that 
in that particular case "[t]he duties imposed and rights 
established through the state tort . . . derive from the rights 
and obligations established by the [collective bargaining] 
contract," and that, consequently, resolution of the issue 
would "inevitably . . . involve contract interpretation." Id. at 
217-18. 
 
The Court reiterated this standard two years later in 
Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386 (1987), where, in 
contrast to Allis-Chalmers, the Court concluded that there 
was no preemption of employees' state law claims. The 
employees had filed suit in state court against Caterpillar, 
alleging a state law claim of breach of their individual 
contracts with the employer based on its representations 
that "they could look forward to indefinite and lasting 
employment" and that "they could count on the corporation 
to take care of them." Id. at 388 (citation omitted). 
Caterpillar removed the action to federal court, relying on 
the doctrine of "complete preemption." The Supreme Court 
concluded that the claims did not arise under federal law, 
that the lawsuit was not preempted, and that therefore it 
was improperly removed. The Court stated: 
 
       Respondents allege that Caterpillar has entered into 
       and breached individual employment contracts with 
       them. Section 301 says nothing about the content or 
       validity of individual employment contracts. It is true 
       that respondents, bargaining unit members at the time 
       of the plant closing, possessed substantial rights under 
       the collective agreement, and could have brought suit 
       under S 301. As masters of the complaint, however, 
       they chose not to do so. 
 
       Moreover, . . . respondents' complaint is not 
       substantially dependent upon interpretation of the 
       collective-bargaining agreement. It does not rely upon 
       the collective agreement indirectly, nor does it address 
       the relationship between the individual contracts and 
       the collective agreement. 
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Id. at 394-95. Thus, under Caterpillar, employees have the 
option of vindicating their interests by means of either a 
section 301 action or an action brought under state law, as 
long as the state-law action as pleaded does not require 
interpretation of the collective bargaining contract. 
 
The Court further elaborated the principles governing 
section 301 analysis in Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic 
Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (1987). In Lingle, the employee filed 
suit against her employer in state court, alleging retaliatory 
discharge for filing a workers' compensation claim, a tort 
recognized by the Illinois courts. The employer removed the 
action to federal court, and then was successful in moving 
to dismiss on the ground of preemption. The Supreme 
Court disagreed, holding that the claim was not preempted. 
The Court reasoned that the elements of the relevant cause 
of action--discharge or threats of discharge coupled with 
intent to deter or interfere with the exercise of rights under 
the worker's compensation law--did not implicate the 
collective bargaining agreement. It stated, "Each of these 
purely factual questions pertains to the conduct of the 
employee and the conduct and the motivation of the 
employer. Neither of the elements requires a court to 
interpret any term of a collective-bargaining agreement." Id. 
at 407. 
 
The Lingle Court distinguished Allis-Chalmers and Lucas 
Floor on that basis, explaining that it had found the claims 
in those cases preempted because the state law claims were 
not "independent" of the collective bargaining agreements. 
Id. at 407 & n.7. The Court recognized that"the state-law 
analysis [of the claim for retaliatory discharge] might well 
involve attention to the same factual considerations as the 
contractual determination of whether Lingle was fired for 
just cause." Id. at 408. But, it stated, "such parallelism" did 
not make "the state-law analysis dependent upon the 
contractual analysis." Id. It continued,"Even if dispute 
resolution pursuant to a collective-bargaining agreement, 
on the one hand, and state law, on the other, would require 
addressing precisely the same set of facts, as long as the 
state-law claim can be resolved without interpreting the 
agreement itself, the claim is `independent' of the agreement 
for S 301 pre-emption purposes." Id. at 409-410. 
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The Lingle Court explained that section 301 preemption 
is premised on a policy of preserving the effectiveness of 
arbitration by preventing employees from end-running the 
dispute resolution process: "Today's decision should make 
clear that interpretation of collective-bargaining agreements 
remains firmly in the arbitral realm; judges can determine 
questions of state law involving labor-management relations 
only if such questions do not require construing collective- 
bargaining agreements." Id. at 411 (footnote omitted). 
Further, the Court emphasized that "the mere fact that a 
broad contractual protection . . . may provide a remedy for 
conduct that coincidentally violates state law does not 
make the existence or the contours of the state-law 
violation dependent upon the [collective bargaining 
agreement]." Id. at 412-13. It is of interest that all three 
decisions, Allis-Chalmers, Caterpillar, and Lingle, were 
unanimous. 
 
The Court's latest word on this subject came in its 1994 
decision in Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107 (1994). This 
case involved a California statute that imposed a penalty on 
employers who failed to pay accrued wages immediately 
upon the discharge of an employee. The State Labor 
Commissioner construed state law to bar the state from 
enforcing the penalty when the employee was covered by a 
collective bargaining agreement. Livadas, an employee 
covered by a collective bargaining agreement, filed a claim 
with the state's enforcement division to recover the penalty 
after she was fired from her supermarket job. When her 
application was denied because of the state's policy, 
Livadas sued in federal court, challenging the policy as 
preempted by the federal labor laws. Looking at it in 
reverse, Livadas claimed that her state law claim was not 
preempted by the federal labor laws. 
 
The principal issue in the Livadas case was not 
preemption by section 301 of the LMRA, which is focused 
on the enforcement of collective bargaining agreements, but 
by section 7 of the NLRA, which grants employees certain 
rights, notably "the right to self-organization, to form, join, 
or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively . . . , 
and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose 
of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection." 
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29 U.S.C. S 157. That is, Livadas argued that the 
Commissioner's policy of enforcing the penalty with respect 
to non-union workers while refusing to do so with respect 
to union workers interfered with the rights granted by 
section 7. The Court agreed with Livadas that the 
Commissioner's policy discriminated between union and 
nonunion workers, interfered with Livadas's rights under 
section 7 of the NLRA, and was therefore preempted. In 
reaching this conclusion, however, the Court had to 
address the Commissioner's contention that section 301 
preempted Livadas's late-wage-payment claim and thereby 
compelled the state policy. Writing for what was again a 
unanimous Court, Justice Souter offered the following 
summary of the Court's section 301 doctrine: 
 
       [T]he pre-emption rule has been applied only to assure 
       that the purposes animating S 301 will be frustrated 
       neither by state laws purporting to determine 
       "questions relating to what the parties to a labor 
       agreement agreed, and what legal consequences were 
       intended to flow from breaches of that agreement," nor 
       by parties' efforts to renege on their arbitration 
       promises by "relabeling" as tort suits actions simply 
       alleging breaches of duties assumed in collective- 
       bargaining agreements. 
 
       In Lueck and in Lingle . . . , we underscored the point 
       that S 301 cannot be read broadly to pre-empt 
       nonnegotiable rights conferred on individual employees 
       as a matter of state law, and we stressed that it is the 
       legal character of a claim, as "independent" of rights 
       under the collective-bargaining agreement, . . . that 
       decides whether a state cause of action may go forward. 
       Finally, we were clear that when the meaning of 
       contract terms is not the subject of dispute, the bare 
       fact that a collective-bargaining agreement will be 
       consulted in the course of state-law litigation plainly 
       does not require the claim to be extinguished. 
 
Id. at 122-24 (citations and footnotes omitted). Accordingly, 
the Court concluded that Livadas's action seeking 
enforcement of the state law penalty was not precluded and 
that the Commissioner's policy declining to enforce her 
state law right was preempted. 
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In a similar analysis shortly thereafter, the Court 
emphasized the limitations on its Lingle holding in 
Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246 (1994), a 
case involving the "virtually identical" standard for 
preemption under the Railway Labor Act, id. at 260. Like 
Lingle, Hawaiian Airlines involved an employee's claim of 
retaliatory discharge. Noting the similarity to the Lingle 
facts, the Court stressed that "the existence of a potential 
[collective bargaining agreement]-based remedy [does] not 
deprive an employee of independent remedies available 
under state law" and reiterated that factual questions about 
an employee's or employer's motives or conduct do not 
require interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement.1 
Id. at 261. 
 
We had occasion to apply the Court's section 301 
jurisprudence with respect to a fraud claim in Trans Penn 
Wax Corp. v. McCandless, 50 F.3d 217 (3d Cir. 1995). The 
plaintiffs in Trans Penn, employees covered by a collective 
bargaining agreement, brought claims against their 
employer for breach of contract, fraud, and intentional 
infliction of emotional distress. The gravamen of the 
complaint was that Trans Penn had made promises to the 
employees that they would retain their jobs if they 
decertified their union and that, after the employees did so, 
the employer reneged on those promises. We held that none 
of these claims were preempted by section 301. Of 
particular relevance to the present case is our holding on 
the fraud claim. Emphasizing the distinction made in Lingle 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. It is also worth noting that a recent opinion of the Supreme Court, 
Textron Lycoming Reciprocating Engine Div., AVCO Corp. v. United 
Automobile, Aerospace, Agricultural Implement Workers of America, 
International Union, 118 S.Ct. 1626 (1998), has taken a very narrow view 
of federal jurisdiction under section 301. The UAW sued Textron, alleging 
that the employer fraudulently induced the union to sign the collective 
bargaining agreement. The court held that because the suit alleged only 
the invalidity of the collective bargaining agreement, and did not allege 
an actual violation of the collective bargaining agreement, there was no 
federal jurisdiction. Although Textron did not involve section 301 
preemption, it did signal a narrow approach to section 301 jurisdiction. 
Because jurisdiction under section 301 is the obverse of preemption, the 
Textron decision suggests a correspondingly narrow scope for 
preemption. 
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between factual questions about motive, on the one hand, 
and the interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement, 
on the other, we concluded that "[a]n examination of the 
employer's behavior, motivation, and statements does not 
substantially depend upon the terms of the collective 
bargaining agreement." Id. at 232. 
 
With these principles in mind, we turn to the case before 
us. To reiterate, plaintiffs contend that GM committed 
common-law fraud by intentionally lying to the employees 
about the status of the Trenton plant in order to induce 
them to leave voluntarily, thereby reducing the payroll. The 
New Jersey Supreme Court has stated that "[a] 
misrepresentation amounting to actual legal fraud consists 
of a material representation of a presently existing or past 
fact, made with knowledge of its falsity and with the 
intention that the other party rely thereon, resulting in 
reliance by that party to his detriment." Jewish Ctr. of 
Sussex County v. Whale, 432 A.2d 521, 524 (N.J. 1981). 
GM urges that a decision whether these elements have 
been shown would require the kind of interpretation of the 
collective bargaining agreement prohibited by the section 
301 preemption doctrine. We are unpersuaded. 
 
GM first focuses on the intent requirement, contending 
that resolution of the issue of GM's intent "requires 
interpretation of the collectively-bargained Special 
Accelerated Attrition Agreement." Appellant's Br. at 23. 
GM's intent in entering into the SAAA, however, is not the 
question put in issue by plaintiffs' complaint. Rather, 
plaintiffs focus on GM's intent in representing that closure 
of the plant was imminent. The amended complaint plainly 
alleges that "GM intentionally misrepresented to Plaintiffs 
the status of the plant closing." App. at 187."GM made the 
misrepresentations, including the omission of information, 
for the purpose of inducing Plaintiffs to quit their jobs and 
accept the SAAA." App. at 188. Hence, plaintiffs are not 
claiming that GM misrepresented the SAAA, but rather they 
are claiming that GM intentionally lied to them in order to 
induce them to end their employment with GM and take 
the SAAA. The resolution of this claim in no way requires 
an interpretation of the SAAA. 
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GM's arguments on materiality, reasonable reliance, and 
detriment are predicated on a single idea--that the 
representations cannot be material unless there were no 
options available to the employees other than the SAAA 
package. Again, GM misapprehends the nature of plaintiffs' 
claim. The materiality question in this case does not focus 
on the availability of other options but on whether GM's 
announcement of the impending closure of the Trenton 
plant was a representation of a fact (1) that the employees 
would reasonably consider important in making choices 
about their employment, or (2) that GM actually or 
constructively knew would inform the employees' choices. 
 
Under New Jersey law, a fact is material if "a reasonable 
[person] would attach importance to its existence or 
nonexistence in determining his [or her] choice of action in 
the transaction in question," or if "the maker of the 
representation knows or has reason to know that its 
recipient regards or is likely to regard the matter as 
important in determining his [or her] choice of action, 
although a reasonable [person] would not so regard it." 
Strawn v. Canuso, 657 A.2d 420, 431 n.4 (N.J. 
1995)(quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts S 538(2) 
(1977)). The resolution of these questions does not call 
upon the court to conduct an investigation into the terms 
of the collective bargaining agreements between the parties; 
it simply requires a determination of whether and how the 
announced closure of the plant would affect the decisions 
of the employees. 
 
GM further argues that the "reasonable reliance" 
question requires interpretation of the collective bargaining 
agreement because one cannot determine whether the 
plaintiffs acted reasonably without weighing all of the 
contractual options available to them. We note at the outset 
that although the parties use the term "reasonable" to 
describe the level of reliance necessary to support a fraud 
cause of action, the New Jersey cases have yet to address 
specifically what kind of reliance is necessary. See B.F. 
Hirsch v. Enright Ref. Co., 751 F.2d 628, 632 (3d Cir. 
1984)("It is not entirely clear to what extent New Jersey law 
requires that the reliance be justifiable."). New Jersey cases 
speak of both "reasonable" and "justifiable" reliance. 
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Compare Judson v. Peoples Bank and Trust Co., 134 A.2d 
761, 765 (N.J. 1957)(using "justifiable reliance"), and Van 
Dam Egg Co. v. Allendale Farms, Inc., 489 A.2d 1209, 1211 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985) (adopting "justifiable 
reliance"), with Louis Schlesinger Co. v. Wilson, 127 A.2d 
13, 18 (N.J. 1956) (stating that action sounding in deceit 
requires "reasonable reliance"), and Carroll v. Celloco 
Partnership, 713 A.2d 509, 516 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1998)(stating that common-law fraud requires "reasonable 
reliance"). As the Supreme Court has recently reminded us, 
these terms carry different meanings: justifiable reliance 
generally connotes a subjective standard, while "reasonable 
reliance" usually suggests an objective standard and, 
possibly, some measure of a duty to investigate on the part 
of the claimant. See Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 70-75 
(1995) (surveying the common law of fraud as it stood in 
1978). 
 
For present purposes, we need not predict which 
formulation the New Jersey Supreme Court will adopt, for 
both of these standards share a common general inquiry-- 
a focus on the credence given the representation by the 
claimant. That is, the reliance inquiry is not, as GM 
suggests, an investigation of the wisdom of the particular 
choice made by the claimant, but instead whether the 
claimant was acting justifiably or reasonably in giving 
credence to the alleged misrepresentation. See id. at 70-71. 
In this case, then, the reliance question focuses on whether 
GM's repeated insistence that the plant was going to close 
was a representation worthy of belief. Patently, this is not 
a question that depends upon an interpretation of the 
collective bargaining agreement. In Trans Penn, we 
considered, and rejected, a nearly identical argument when 
considering the elements of fraud under Pennsylvania law: 
"The essence of the employees' [fraud] case is proof of 
justifiable reliance on the separate guarantees[i.e., the 
company's promise of job security], not on the collective 
bargaining agreements." 50 F.3d at 232. 
 
For similar reasons, we reject GM's contention that 
resolving whether the employees' reliance was detrimental 
would require an investigation of the terms of the collective 
bargaining agreements. To be sure, we anticipate that at 
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trial, principally in determining damages, the question 
whether the plaintiffs were worse off for having taken early 
retirement may arise. However, the fact that the parties' 
agreements may be referred to in the course of deciding this 
issue is of little moment to the preemption question before 
us. As the Court emphasized in Livadas, "the bare fact that 
a collective-bargaining agreement will be consulted in the 
course of state-law litigation plainly does not require the 
claim to be extinguished." 512 U.S. at 124 (citation 
omitted). Similarly, as the Court stated in Lingle: 
 
       A collective-bargaining agreement may, of course, 
       contain information such as rate of pay and other 
       economic benefits that might be helpful in determining 
       the damages to which a worker prevailing in a state- 
       law suit is entitled. Although federal law would govern 
       the interpretation of the agreement to determine the 
       proper damages, the underlying state-law claim, not 
       otherwise pre-empted, would stand. Thus, as a general 
       proposition, a state-law claim may depend for its 
       resolution upon both the interpretation of a collective- 
       bargaining agreement and a separate state-law analysis 
       that does not turn on the agreement. In such a case, 
       federal law would govern the interpretation of the 
       agreement, but the separate state-law analysis would 
       not be thereby pre-empted. 
 
486 U.S. at 413 n. 12 (citation omitted). 
 
GM also raises an alternative argument that the fraud 
claim is founded directly on rights created by the collective 
bargaining agreement because any duty to disclose on the 
part of GM could only arise under the contract. In support 
of this contention, GM cites our decision in Lightning Lube, 
Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153 (3d Cir. 1993), for the 
proposition that "a fraud claim based upon silence is not 
actionable unless there exists an affirmative duty to 
disclose; and such duty arises only when there is actually 
or essentially a fiduciary relationship." Appellant's Br. at 
33. 
 
The first difficulty with this argument is that plaintiffs do 
not base their fraud claim on GM's silence. The plaintiffs 
have alleged affirmative misrepresentations to the 
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employees, rather than a failure to disclose simpliciter. As 
stated by the Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior 
Court, "Even where no duty to speak exists, one who elects 
to speak must tell the truth when it is apparent that 
another may reasonably rely on the statements made." 
Strawn v. Canuso, 638 A.2d 141, 149 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 
1994), aff'd, 657 A.2d 420 (N.J. 1995). Therefore, the 
relevance of our discussion in Lightning Lube of New Jersey 
law concerning fraud claims based on silence is 
questionable at best. Furthermore, to the extent that 
Lightning Lube is pertinent here, it is contrary to GM's 
position. In that case, we stated: "[W]here a claim for fraud 
is based on silence or concealment, New Jersey courts will 
not imply a duty to disclose, unless such disclosure is 
necessary to make a previous statement true or the parties 
share a `special relationship.' " 4 F.3d at 1185 (quoting 
Berman v. Gurwicz, 458 A.2d 1311, 1313 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
Ch. Div. 1981)). At minimum, plaintiffs have alleged, and 
provided record support for, a "previous statement" that is 
untrue without a timely disclosure of the company's plan to 
pursue sale of the plant. 
 
In sum, the fraud claim in this case is not directly based 
upon the collective bargaining agreements in force between 
the parties; nor will the resolution of the elements of 
common-law fraud require the interpretation of those 
bargaining agreements. Plaintiffs, in pursuing their fraud 
claim, are seeking vindication of a "nonnegotiable right[ ] 
conferred on individual employees as a matter of state law" 
that is " `independent' of rights under the collective- 
bargaining agreement." Livadas, 512 U.S. at 123. 
Resolution of the common-law fraud issue in this action 
will not frustrate the uniform development of federal law 
governing labor contract interpretation nor allow the 
employees to sidestep the grievance machinery by dressing 
up a contract grievance as a tort. Consequently there is no 
ground for section 301 preemption in this case. 
Accordingly, we turn to the question whether the NLRA 
preempts plaintiffs' cause of action. 
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B. 
 
Garmon Preemption 
 
GM also urges that the plaintiffs' fraud claims are 
preempted by sections 7 and 8 of the NLRA under the 
principles of Garmon preemption, a doctrine originating in 
the Supreme Court's decision in San Diego Building Trades 
Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959). Garmon 
preemption protects the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB 
over unfair labor practice proceedings; accordingly, if a 
cause of action implicates protected concerted activity 
under section 7 of the NLRA or conduct that would be 
prohibited as an unfair labor practice under section 8 of the 
NLRA, the cause of action is preempted. See id. at 242-44. 
 
The Court summarized the nature of Garmon preemption 
in Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491 (1983): 
 
       [S]tate regulations and causes of action are 
       presumptively preempted if they concern conduct that 
       is actually or arguably either prohibited or protected by 
       the Act. The state regulation or cause of action may, 
       however, be sustained if the behavior to be regulated is 
       behavior that is of only peripheral concern to the 
       federal law or touches interests deeply rooted in local 
       feeling and responsibility. 
 
Id. at 498 (citations omitted). 
 
In International Longshoremen's Association v. Davis, 476 
U.S. 380 (1986), the Court elaborated on what it meant by 
"arguably" in the prior Garmon preemption cases: 
 
       If the word "arguably" is to mean anything, it must 
       mean that the party claiming pre-emption is required 
       to demonstrate that his case is one that the Board 
       could legally decide in [the suing employee's] favor. 
       That is, a party asserting pre-emption must advance 
       an interpretation of the Act that is not plainly contrary 
       to its language and that has not been "authoritatively 
       rejected" by the courts or the Board. The party must 
       then put forth enough evidence to enable the court to 
       find that the Board reasonably could uphold a claim 
       based on such an interpretation. 
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Id. at 395 (citation omitted). The party claiming preemption 
bears the burden of demonstrating that the challenged 
activity is arguably prohibited by the NLRA. Id.  
 
GM urges that the conduct which is the subject of 
plaintiffs' complaint would constitute a refusal to bargain 
under section 8(a)(5) of the Act and/or bargaining in bad 
faith under section 8(d) of the Act. Section 8(a)(5) makes it 
an unfair labor practice for an employer "to refuse to 
bargain collectively with the representatives of his 
employees" and section 8(d) imposes a requirement that 
such bargaining be done "in good faith." 29 U.S.C. 
SS 158(a)(5), (d). However, the duties to bargain and to do 
so in good faith only attach to the "mandatory subjects of 
bargaining," which are those set forth in section 8(d), i.e., 
"wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment." Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat 
Cutters & Butcher Workmen of N. Am., AFL-CIO v. Jewel Tea 
Co., 381 U.S. 676, 685 (1965) (citation omitted); see also 
NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 742-43 (1962). 
 
If an employer imposes a unilateral change with respect 
to a mandatory subject, it thereby violates the statutory 
duty to bargain and is subject to the Board's remedial 
order. See Katz, 369 U.S. at 742-43. But, conversely, a 
unilateral change as to a non-mandatory subject and the 
refusal to bargain over a non-mandatory subject are not 
unfair labor practices. NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner, 
356 U.S. 342, 349 (1958). The decision to close a plant is 
plainly one that the employer can make and announce 
unilaterally; that decision is not a mandatory subject of 
bargaining. See First Nat'l. Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 
U.S. 666, 686 (1981). But see id. at 677 n.15 (noting that 
employer has a duty to bargain over the effects of such a 
closure). Consequently, there is no Board jurisdiction, and 
therefore no Garmon preemption, regarding complaints that 
an employer refused to bargain over a plant closing. 
 
It is true, as GM argues, that the employer's duty to 
bargain in good faith is a continuing one, and that it is not 
dispositive that formal collective negotiations were not 
occurring at the time of an alleged breach of sections 8(a)(5) 
and 8(d). However, the alleged fraud was not committed in 
connection with any part of the collective bargaining 
 
                                21 
  
process nor does it touch and concern a mandatory duty on 
the part of the employer. The plaintiffs do not allege that 
any bargaining between the Union and GM was in bad 
faith, or that the retirement benefits that they received were 
other than provided for them under the relevant agreement. 
 
Because GM has no duty under the NLRA to bargain over 
its decision regarding the closing of a plant, First Nat'l 
Maintenance, 452 U.S. at 679 n.15, and the plaintiffs' 
complaint does not allege that GM breached its duty to 
bargain over effects, the matter that forms the basis of this 
fraud action--viz., GM's intent vel non to close its Trenton 
plant--cannot be recast as an unfair labor practice under 
either section 8(d) or section 8(a)(5). Where, as here, the 
claim is that the employer committed fraud in a direct 
communication to the employees on the subject of a plant 
closure, there is no NLRA preemption. 
 
Comparison with the very cases cited by GM underscores 
why the District Court correctly found no preemption here. 
For example, in Serrano v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., LTV, 
790 F.2d 1279 (6th Cir. 1986), the employees' fraud claims 
that were held preempted implicated the bargaining process 
directly because the employees claimed that the employer 
defrauded them by extracting concessions in bargaining 
while falsely promising to invest in the plant to keep it 
going. The Serrano court stated: "[T]he gravamen of the 
three fraud charges is that J & L did not bargain in good 
faith in obtaining concessions from the Union in the 
[collective bargaining] agreement." Unlike Serrano, this case 
does not concern the employer's extraction of concessions 
from the union in bargaining, but rather concerns GM's 
alleged fraudulent announcement that the plant would 
close, an announcement that was independent of the 
bargaining process. 
 
This distinction holds true for the other cases cited by 
GM where the employees' claims were preempted. See 
Parker v. Connors Steel Co., 855 F.2d 1510, 1515-18 (11th 
Cir. 1988)(fraud claim relating to concessions obtained by 
employer during bargaining); Kolentus v. Avco Corp., 798 
F.2d 949, 960-62 (7th Cir. 1986)(claim of fraudulent 
nondisclosure of plan to close plant during contract 
negotiations); see also Talbot v. Robert Matthews Distrib. 
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Co., 961 F.2d 654, 660 (7th Cir. 1992) (finding preemption 
of claim that bargaining-unit work was improperly 
transferred without a union vote because claim was 
equivalent to charge that employer unilaterally changed 
terms and conditions of employment in violation of section 
8(a)(5)). In contrast to those cases, here there is no 
necessary nexus between the challenged representations 
and collective bargaining. 
 
Courts considering cases that more closely parallel the 
situation here have found no preemption. In Wells v. 
General Motors Corp., 881 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1989), 
employees alleged that the employer offered false 
inducements in order to persuade the employees to accept 
a voluntary termination plan which, like the one in this 
case, was the product of prior collective bargaining. The 
employer was alleged to have misrepresented the 
employees' eligibility for rehire if they accepted the plan. 
The court found the fraud claim was not preempted under 
Garmon principles or section 301. The court reasoned that 
the claim could not be construed as one of bargaining in 
bad faith, and emphasized that eligibility for future 
employment is not a mandatory bargaining subject. 
Turning then to whether the complaint could be recast as 
an allegation of direct dealing with the employees, the court 
stated, in a passage equally applicable here: "For better or 
worse, the bargaining process had served its function, and 
the union representatives had fulfilled their role [by 
negotiating the voluntary termination agreement]. It was 
then left to the individual employees to choose whether they 
would opt for the plan, and it is upon that choice that GM's 
alleged inducements operated." Id. at 171-72. To the same 
effect is the Ninth Circuit's decision in Milne Employees 
Association v. Sun Carriers, 960 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(finding no preemption where plaintiffs raised fraud claims 
based on the allegation that the employer made 
representations of continuing employment while actively 
concealing plans to close the plant). 
 
In short, GM has not met its burden of demonstrating 
that this case is one that the Board could legally decide in 
the employees' favor. GM has not shown that its alleged 
misrepresentation to the employees would be an unfair 
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labor practice. And, as noted previously, plaintiffs' fraud 
claim does not require interpretation of the collective 
agreements between the parties such that preemption 
under LMRA section 301 would be appropriate. 
 
III. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court's denial of GM's summary judgment motion. 
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